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FACULTY STATEMENT ON SOVIET VISITORS
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We believe that Stanford University has taken an overly rigid position in
response to the request from the State Department and the National
Academy of Sciences that certain restrictions be placed on the Soviet
engineer Umnov in connection with his proposed visit to Professor Roth
of the Mechanical Engineering Department.  Far fetched interpretations
have been given to what the State Department is asking, and no willingness
has been indicated to negotiate the proposed restrictions or their
interpretation.

Stanford has given the impression that it takes an
attitude of total opposition towards the Government's efforts to restrict
technology transfer to the Soviet Union.  Moreover, this attitude seems to
be supported by a number of untrue statements in a Stanford press release -
namely, (1) The Soviets are
ahead of the U.S. in robotics.  (2) Robotics has no military applications.
(3) There are no possible restrictions on Soviet visitors that won't
disrupt the functioning of the University.

Consider the following not-so-hypothetical implication of the story:
that when the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco reported on the situation
to Moscow, this report probably reinforced the idea in Moscow that
American protests about Poland, Afghanistan, Sakharov,
Scharansky, etc. were a governmental sham
without any support in the institutions of the country such as
universities.

We believe that Stanford should adopt a policy toward Soviet
visitors that balances the following considerations:
@begin(enumerate)
           Preserving the orderly functioning of the academic processes of
research, publication and teaching and avoiding the creation of a security
atmosphere.

	   Showing the visitors a society more open than their own.

           Minimizing transfer of militarily useful technology so as to
minimize our own defense costs; perhaps we can help obviate the need for a
return to the draft.  Ways of implementing this without security measures
need study.

           Increasing reciprocity so that access to Soviet research
becomes available to Americans to the same extent that our research
activities are accessible to them.  This involves some degree of support
to the bargaining efforts on our behalf conducted by the State Department
and the National Academy of Sciences.

           Maintaining good relations with the State Department, the
Defense Department and other Government agencies.
We believe that a policy not involving security classification can
considerably reduce such technology transfer is undesirable without
requiring any restrictions on what is discussed in seminars, written
in reports and taught in class.
Complete non-co-operation may result in Government and industry
having to move much university research elsewhere or security restrictions being
imposed by law.
@end(enumerate)
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	Since these goals are not entirely compatible, some degree of
compromise is needed.

        As scholars   who have interchanges with Soviet scientists
and who occasionally visit Soviet universities and institutes, we are
particularly affected by item 4.  Our access to ideas and laboratories
is always severely limited - for example, by the Soviet law that foreigners
can only be given already published information unless there
is special permission.
A certain reciprocity in our treatment of Soviet visitors would demonstrate that
we understand what is being done and will not tolerate it.

        We recognize that Stanford is an open institution. But with care
and planning, we can affect what Soviet visitors see. Stanford, of
course, as an institution, cannot control what people say, but people
who are concerned can be careful about what they say and how they distribute
unpublished reports.

	We request that Stanford undertake to develop a policy taking into
account the above considerations and to negotiate with the State Department
Defense Department and the National Academy of Sciences in a spirit of
compromise.  If
an interim statement clarifying the impression given by the Stanford press
release could be made, it might help mitigate the unfortunate signals that
may have been sent to Moscow.